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I. INTRODUCTION 
In-house counsel gets the pleasure of working more intimately with 
their clients than would an attorney working at a law firm.  This pleasure 
manifests itself in many ways, but one of the best ways is when somebody 
in the office stops by for a chat that quickly turns to a request for free legal 
advice.  In-house counsel could (and should) explain to that person what it 
means to have the corporation, rather than an individual, as the client, and 
that the company does not pay its in-house counsel to be a free legal clinic 
to its employees.  Still, as in-house counsel, and in particular, as in-house 
intellectual property counsel, it is not unheard of for a young marketing 
manager to knock on the door and eventually ask if the in-house counsel 
could represent her in her divorce.1 
It is easy for in-house counsel to laugh off such a request 
(sympathetically, of course), especially in-house intellectual property 
counsel.  But what if intellectual property counsel should pay closer attention 
to family law?  What if the intersection of intellectual property law, 
specifically patent law, and family law creates an odd, unresolved 
conundrum that jeopardizes valuable company assets?  What if—perish the 
thought—in-house intellectual property counsel actually needs to understand 
the employees’ rights in marital property? 
It might just be so. 
Consider this.  Under U.S. patent law, ownership of a patent 
automatically vests, as personal property, in the individual inventor.2  Many, 
if not most, inventors are employees who, under some written obligation 
(such as a routine employment agreement), assign their ownership rights to 
the inventions created as part of their jobs to their employers.  At the same 
time, however, property acquired by a married individual (in most, if not all 
states) is considered marital or community3 property of the married couple.  
In that case, then, when an employee invents something and acquires an 
interest in a patent (which acquisition occurs automatically upon invention 
under U.S. law), doesn’t that patent first become marital property of the 
 
 1  Any reference to real-life events, or real-life young marketing managers with 
seemingly troubled marriages, are purely coincidental. 
 2  35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 3  The terms “marital” and “community” property are used interchangeably throughout 
this article to refer to property acquired during the course of the marriage by either spouse 
that is not otherwise excluded as “separate” property of the spouse under the state’s marital 
laws.  By contrast, we do not use these terms to imply that a community property regime or 
jurisdiction is a distinct system with its own rules regarding the control and distribution of 
marital property.  Such a system is distinguishable from equitable-based common law 
regimes.  When referring to a community property regime or jurisdiction, we designate it as 
such.  These regimes will be discussed in greater detail in Part III of this article. 
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couple before the employee assigns the employee’s interest to the employer?  
In other words, how does an employer who receives an assignment from the 
employee alone of only the employee’s interest avoid ending up owning the 
patent jointly with the spouse who has his or her own undivided interest in 
the marital property? 
In this article, an intellectual property lawyer and a family lawyer will 
explore this quirk in the law of patent ownership which creates serious 
unresolved ownership issues for corporate patent assets.  This article will 
address the background of patent ownership from a federal patent law 
perspective, including how ownership of a patent is acquired and conveyed, 
and the peculiar but important difference between “legal” title and 
“equitable” title to a patent.  This article will then discuss concepts of marital 
property, including how property acquired by one spouse during a marriage 
can become jointly held marital property.  This article will address whether 
a spouse’s ownership interest in marital property acquired by the other 
spouse (such as a patent invented by that spouse) is “legal” or “equitable” 
ownership.  This article will then address whether, if a patent is marital 
property, a married inventor’s conveyance of his or her interest in a patent to 
his or her employer is sufficient to convey the entire interest in the marital 
property, or whether the company employer has received less title than it 
thought.  Having sufficiently stirred the pot, this article will attempt to 
unravel the emergent problem and propose workable solutions. 
II. PATENT OWNERSHIP AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that 
Congress shall be entitled “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”4  The reference to 
“inventors” has been interpreted to mean that only natural persons can be 
inventors of a patent,5 and ownership of a patent initially vests in the 
inventor.6  Each inventor can, however, assign all or a part of her interest in 
her patent to another in writing.7  Joint ownership of a patent has also been 
described as “tenancy in common” ownership.8  A patent is a right to exclude 
others (as opposed to a right to do anything), and that right to exclude is 
specifically the right to prevent others from making, using, selling, offering 
 
 4  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 5  Beech Aircraft, 990 F.2d at 1248. 
 6  Id. 
 7  35 U.S.C. § 261; see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1119–
20 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 8  E.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (patent ownership manifests the properties of tenancy in common). 
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for sale or import any patented invention.9  The owner of that right to exclude 
can sue others who violate that right, or license someone to permit another 
party to use that right.  Identifying proper ownership of a patent, therefore, 
is critical because only the owner of legal title to a patent has standing to sue 
as a plaintiff to enforce the patent right.10  And, if there is more than one 
owner of a patent,11 and one co-owner of a patent refuses to join a lawsuit, 
the suit must be dismissed for lack of standing.12  Thus, a co-owner of a 
patent who does not want to join a lawsuit, or who desires to license the 
technology separately, can block the other co-owner from enjoying the 
patent right.  Further, the courts have specified that legal title is what matters 
for standing, not equitable title.13  In brief, legal title transfers when someone 
with an ownership interest actually conveys, in real time, her interest in the 
patent to another.  By contrast, equitable title might arise when a person is 
under an obligation to receive title, but title has not actually been yet 
conveyed.14  Of particular interest in patent cases, an agreement that an 
inventor “will assign” her inventions creates only equitable ownership of the 
purported assignee.15  A present assignment, however, such as that the 
inventor “hereby assigns,” is sufficient to assign legal title.16  Legal title can 
even be transferred in not-yet-created inventions through a present 
assignment (i.e., “hereby assigns”) of an expectation interest, such as 
inventions that will arise in the scope of future employment.17  In that case, 
assignment vests legal title to the patent in the assignee the moment the 
patent application comes into being, i.e., it is filed.18 
III. FAMILY LAW AND OWNERSHIP OF PERSONAL PROPERTY: THE 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND EQUITABLE PROPERTY APPROACHES 
TO MARITAL PROPERTY 
In this section of the article, we provide an overview of family law 
doctrines of property ownership, control, and dissolution during and after a 
marriage.  Specifically, while family law varies (sometimes radically) from 
 
 9  35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 10  See Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 11  This might occur if a patent is invented jointly; see supra notes 7–10 and 
accompanying text. 
 12  Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891). 
 13  Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1579–82. 
 14  Id. at 1578 n.3 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1486 (6th ed. 1990) (“Equitable 
title may be defined as ‘the beneficial interest of one person whom equity regards as the real 
owner, although the legal title is vested in another.’”)). 
 15  Id. at 1581.  
 16  Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 17  FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 18  Id. at 1573.  As discussed infra, the court’s discussion of just how legal title vests 
should be read carefully, especially in light of the present subject matter of this paper. 
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state to state, this section notes trends among the states and highlights 
doctrines that serve to inform the challenges that arise at the intersection of 
family law and patent law when patent ownership is transferred during an 
intact marriage. 
 Treatment of Marital Property During Marriage and at 
Dissolution 
For purposes of family law, different property regimes govern property 
ownership and control during the marriage and at the dissolution of 
marriage.19  Traditionally, states focused exclusively on title to determine 
ownership and control of property during a marriage.20  Under the common 
law doctrine of coverture, where the legal rights of the wife were subsumed 
by the husband under a theory of unity, married women could not acquire 
title to property on their own while married.21  Therefore, all property 
acquired during marriage became the husband’s property, and he held title 
to it.22  By the mid-nineteenth century, most states enacted married women’s 
property statutes, which eliminated the doctrine of coverture, giving married 
women the ability to retain title to property they acquired separately before 
the marriage and to hold title to property during the marriage.23  For 
determining ownership and management of marital property during 
marriage, most common law jurisdictions still use a title system.24  This 
necessitates determining how the property is held by the spouses, whether 
that be in “joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, [or by] tenancy in 
common,” to determine whether either spouse may dispose of the property 
unilaterally.25  Moreover, spouses are able to retain title in their separate 
property, typically property acquired before the marriage or property 
acquired by one spouse during the marriage through gift, devise, or 
bequest.26 
 
 19  DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 471–73 (3d ed. 2012).   
 20  Id. at 471. 
 21  Id. at 472.   
 22  See ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, WORK OF THE FAMILY LAWYER 466 
(4th ed. 2016).  
 23  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 472.  
 24  See id. at 471–72; Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 75, 124 (2004). 
 25  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 472. 
 26  See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.130 (West 2017) (defining separate property as “[a]ll 
property of a spouse owned by him or her before marriage, and that was acquired by him or 
her afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, descent or by an award for personal injury damages, 
with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is his or her separate property.”); see also 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/503 (2019) (providing a more exhaustive definition of separate or non-marital 
property as:  
(1) property acquired by gift, legacy or descent or property acquired in 
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At the dissolution of marriage, the traditional common law approach 
followed the title system, awarding property to the spouse who held title to 
the property.27  In practice, this often resulted in inequitable property 
distributions, as the husband often held title to the majority of marital 
property.  This inequity led some states to adopt a community property 
approach to marital property.28 
Under a community property approach, spouses retain rights to 
ownership and control of their separate property.29  However, spouses 
acquire a one-half vested interest in all marital property, regardless of who 
holds title to the property.30  In response to the advent of community property 
regimes, traditional common law states also began to alter how they treated 
marital property at dissolution of the marriage.31  While each spouse 
continued to retain his or her separate property, the court would divide all 
 
exchange for such property; (2) property acquired in exchange for 
property acquired before the marriage; (3) property acquired by a spouse 
after a judgment of legal separation; (4) property excluded by valid 
agreement of the parties, including a premarital agreement or a 
postnuptial agreement; (5) any judgment or property obtained by 
judgment awarded to a spouse from the other spouse except, however, 
when a spouse is required to sue the other spouse in order to obtain 
insurance coverage or otherwise recover from a third party and the 
recovery is directly related to amounts advanced by the marital estate, the 
judgment shall be considered marital property; (6) property acquired 
before the marriage, except as it relates to retirement plans that may have 
both marital and non-marital characteristics; (6.5) all property acquired 
by a spouse by the sole use of non-marital property as collateral for a loan 
that then is used to acquire property during the marriage; to the extent that 
the marital estate repays any portion of the loan, it shall be considered a 
contribution from the marital estate to the non-marital estate subject to 
reimbursement; (7) the increase in value of non-marital property, 
irrespective of whether the increase results from a contribution of marital 
property, non-marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or 
otherwise, subject to the right of reimbursement provided in subsection 
(c) of this Section; and (8) income from property acquired by a method 
listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection if the income is not 
attributable to the personal effort of a spouse.). 
 27  See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 124.  
 28  OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 22, at 466 (discussing the evolution of marital 
property laws in equitable distribution jurisdictions). 
 29  Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 124–25.  Community property states define separate 
property in a manner consistent with common law states as property acquired by one spouse 
before the marriage or during the marriage through gift, bequest or devise.  See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 25-211(A) (LexisNexis 2019) (defining separate property as “[a]ll property acquired 
by either husband or wife during the marriage is the community property of the husband and 
wife except for property that is: 1. Acquired by gift, devise or descent. 2. Acquired after 
service of a petition for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment if the petition 
results in a decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment.”) 
 30  Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 125; ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473. 
 31  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473–74. 
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marital property, regardless of title, in an equitable manner.32  As a result, at 
the time of dissolution, community property and equitable distribution 
systems operated in very similar manners. 
A minority of states treat all property, separate and marital, the same at 
the time of dissolution.33  Under this “all property” approach, there are no 
legal distinctions between separate and marital property and the court is free 
to divide property in an equitable manner to the divorcing spouses.34 
 Challenges to Treating Patents as “Property” Under Family Law 
One challenge raised by this article is whether family law would treat a 
patent as marital property irrespective of the regime it uses to determine 
property ownership in marriage.  Most state statutes use very broad language 
to describe marital property.35  Moreover, when interpreting these statutes, 
courts usually take a constrained approach in interpreting the exceptions to 
marital property, excluding only that property which is specifically 
designated as “separate” under the statute.36  As a result, most forms of 
property acquired during marriage are considered marital (or community) 
property.  Despite the broad statutory definitions of marital property, courts 
have rejected the application of marital property law in instances where it 
did not serve the larger purposes of family law.37  For example, some courts 
have provided a differentiated analysis of personal injury awards received 
during marriage.38  In Hardy v. Hardy,39 the Supreme Court of West Virginia 
looked to the reason for the personal injury award in determining whether it 
could be characterized as separate or marital (community) property.  In 
instances where the award was to compensate for “pain, suffering, disability, 
disfigurement, or other debilitation of the mind or body,” the court reasoned 
that the award should be considered separate property.40  However, when the 
award was to compensate for economic loss, “such as past wages and 
 
 32  Id.  
 33  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 476 (citing J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION 
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 3.03[2] (2011) and noting the all-property approach 
adopted by Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming). 
 34  Id.  
 35  OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 22, at 468. 
 36  See OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 22, at 468–69 (discussing the general 
presumption contained in many equitable distribution jurisdictions that “all property acquired 
legally or equitably during a marriage by either party is marital property”). 
 37  JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, 387–404 (3d ed. 
2005). 
 38  Id. at 404–06. 
 39  413 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1991).  
 40  Id. at 156; see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 405 (discussing the decision in Hardy 
v. Hardy). 
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medical expenses, which diminish the marital estate,” the award was to be 
considered marital property.41 
Courts have similarly struggled with whether to classify degrees or 
professional licenses earned during marriage as marital property.42  In 
rejecting the classification of a professional degree earned during marriage 
as marital property, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Mahoney v. 
Mahoney,43 emphasized the fact that the degree had an “uncertain and 
unquantifiable . . .  future monetary value.”44  This position, however, is not 
uniformly embraced across the country.  Most notably, New York has treated 
a professional license as marital property.  In O’Brien v. O’Brien,45 the New 
York Court of Appeals explained that the New York equitable distribution 
marital property statutes “recognize[] that spouses have an equitable claim 
to things of value arising out of the marital relationship.”46 
Finally, professional goodwill has received mixed treatment in family 
law courts across the country.  Some jurisdictions refuse to treat professional 
goodwill as an asset to be distributed upon divorce, reasoning that it is only 
valuable to an individual and “cannot be separately sold or pledged by the 
individual owner[].”47  Other jurisdictions, however, recognize it as marital 
property when it can be distinguished from the actual practitioner.48  Still 
other jurisdictions treat professional goodwill generally as a marital 
property, despite struggling with how to assign it value.49 
Patents share some of the same challenges to marital property 
classification as do personal injury awards, professional degrees and licenses 
and professional goodwill.  Because a patent is only a right to exclude, and 
that exclusionary right may or may not exclude anything valuable, a patent 
is difficult to value and may not create any economic benefit to the marriage 
that would be subject to equitable distribution.  However, unlike the 
professional degree or professional goodwill, it can be transferred to another 
individual or entity.50  Moreover, a patent might be considered unique to the 
inventor in a way that is analogous to the way an individual loss is unique to 
 
 41  Hardy, 413 S.E.2d at 156; see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 405 (discussing the 
decision in Hardy v. Hardy). 
 42  GREGORY, supra note 37, at 406–07. 
 43  453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982); see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 408 (discussing the 
decision in Mahoney v. Mahoney). 
 44  Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 531. 
 45  489 N.E.2d 712, 715 (N.Y. 1985). 
 46  Id. at 715; see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 409–411 (discussing the decision in 
O’Brien v. O’Brien). 
 47  Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981); see also GREGORY, 
supra note 37, at 413. 
 48  GREGORY, supra note 37, at 413. 
 49  Id.  
 50  See supra Part II (discussing the transferability of interests in a patent). 
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the injured spouse.  As such, it might be defensible to treat a patent as 
separate property of the inventor spouse in much the same way as the pain 
and suffering component of a personal injury award is treated as the separate 
property of the injured spouse.  On the other hand, a patent’s potential to 
generate an economic benefit that could be recognized by the marriage 
would suggest that it is more closely analogous to the compensation for loss 
of future earnings.  In fact, most patents that are subject to valuation are 
valued in the same way that a business would be valued, utilizing tools such 
as the income method, cost method, and the cost of substitute technologies.51  
Just as a business acquired during a marriage is routinely treated as marital 
property (and valued at dissolution), so might a patent.  In fact, in the few 
cases that have addressed patent ownership in the context of marital 
dissolution, courts have implicitly accepted the premise that patents could be 
characterized as marital property.52  This approach seems appropriate given 
the breadth of the definition of marital property and the fact that patents are 
transferable and have the potential to generate an economic benefit that could 
be distributed in a divorce action. 
 Management of Marital Property During the Marriage 
While issues surrounding management of marital property during an 
intact marriage do not arise with regularity in family law, these issues are 
critical to understanding the dilemma this article presents.  As the authors 
will demonstrate below, the automatic vesting of patent ownership rights by 
virtue of an assignment typical for most employment agreements actually 
creates a problem of divided patent ownership if a spouse also 
“automatically” acquires an interest in a patent invented during the marriage.  
To understand whether, and to what degree, a spouse acquires an interest in 
a patent (or patent rights) acquired during the marriage, we must understand 
how marital property acquired during the marriage is handled.  And, despite 
the similarities in treatment of marital property at the time of divorce, 
community property jurisdictions and equitable property jurisdictions have 
divergent ways of handling the management of property during the marriage. 
Those distinctions might be critical to the present dilemma. 
In community property jurisdictions, spouses are “equal owners of all 
property acquired during marriage, regardless of how the property is 
 
 51  See Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Protection 
Portfolios Through Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 467 
(2007); Daniel E. Orr, How To Pick A Winning Patent, 21 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2017). 
 52  See infra Part IV (discussing the treatment of patents in marriage in the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals); Allan Woodworth, Note, Divorcing Ideas, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 487, 
495–505 (2012) (discussing the treatment of patents and copyrights as marital property). 
SHULMAN & UPCHURCH (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2019  2:43 PM 
10 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
nominally titled.”53  The spouses each have a one-half interest in the 
community property.54  As a result, both spouses need to consent to the 
transfer of community property.55  As will be demonstrated below, this 
requirement creates an enormous potential ownership conflict if (and when) 
a married employee assigns inventions created in the course of his 
employment to his or her employer.  By contrast, equitable property 
jurisdictions retain the use of title to determine property governance issues.56  
Therefore, the spouse who has title to the property could transfer the property 
without consent of his or her spouse.57  Thus, where an employee is an 
inventor, and, under the patent laws, is the individual title holder to the patent 
right, he or she may be able to assign the invention to the employer without 
creating an ownership conflict with the spouse. 
These differences in how jurisdictions handle management issues 
related to marital property highlight the challenge parties face in ensuring 
orderly and predictable ownership of a patent.  We turn to that in more detail 
below. 
IV. EXAMINATION OF PATENT OWNERSHIP DISPUTES AMONG EMPLOYEE, 
SPOUSE AND EMPLOYER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Married employees who invent, and, therefore, acquire patent rights, in 
the course of both their marriage and their employment, must serve two 
masters.  As demonstrated above, in community property states, property 
acquired by the married employee during the marriage is immediately, upon 
acquisition (or, in other words, upon invention) one-half owned by the 
spouse who must consent to its transfer.58  At the same time, an employer 
that requires its employees to sign a typical employment agreement stating 
that the employee “hereby assigns” all rights to future company inventions 
to the employer, expects to receive all such rights, without sharing ownership 
with the employee’s spouse.  So which master prevails?  In this section, the 
authors will discuss some of the most relevant case law to that difficult (and 
still open) question. 
The intersection between the laws of patent ownership, acquisition and 
 
 53  Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 125. 
 54  Id. at 124–25; ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473. 
 55  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473 (Spouses can provide written consent to each other, 
empowering a spouse to have sole management decisions regarding the property.).  See CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 1100–1103 (designating the rights of spouses to control community property). 
 56  Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 124. 
 57  This is of course subject to the nature of how the spouses hold title to the property.  
For example, different management rules would apply if the spouses held the property in a 
joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or by tenancy in common.  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 
472. 
 58  See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (discussing community property rules).   
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transfer, and the laws of marital property ownership, acquisition and transfer, 
has arisen in a handful of cases.  The first, and perhaps most extensive 
discussion, of the topic was by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit59 in Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Communications, Inc.60  In that case, Mr. 
Mundi Fomukong (“Fomukong”) conceived of and received two U.S. 
patents during his marriage to Fonda Whitfield (“Whitfield”).61  About two 
years later, Fomukong and Whitfield filed for a summary dissolution, or as 
the court put it, a “quickie divorce,” under California law.62  Under a 
summary dissolution under California law, the parties must attest that either 
(1) they have no community property, or (2) they have a signed property 
settlement agreement listing and dividing their community property and 
assets.63  Despite the fact that the patents were acquired by Fomukong during 
the marriage, and, therefore, were presumptively community property, 
Fomukong and Whitfield filed for summary dissolution under the first 
option, checking the box on the petition next to the statement: “We have no 
community assets or liabilities.”64  Under California law, their “quickie 
divorce” became final six months later.65 
A few months later, Fomukong assigned the patents to a company he 
had formed, Enovsys.66  Enovsys then sued Sprint Nextel for patent 
infringement.67  Sprint Nextel moved to dismiss the claim for lack of 
standing, alleging that Whitfield had obtained co-ownership of the patents as 
community property under California law and that she had not assigned her 
interest to Fomukong, or for that matter, Enovsys.68  The district court denied 
the motion, finding that Enovsys had full title and that any ownership issue, 
if there were one, would have to be resolved first in California state court.69 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit discussed whether Whitfield had any 
ownership interest in the patents at the time the lawsuit against Sprint Nextel 
was filed.  The court considered Sprint Nextel’s argument that the divorce 
decree, which identified that the parties had no community property, 
nevertheless failed to assign Whitfield’s interest, and that, therefore, she was 
 
 59  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over 
appeals of cases arising under U.S. patent laws.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).  
 60  614 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 61  Id. at 1336. 
 62  Id. at 1336–37. 
 63  Id. at 1337. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Enovsys, 614 F.3d at 1337. 
 67  Id. at 1337–38. 
 68  Id. at 1338. 
 69  Id. 
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still a co-owner of the patent.70  On the other hand, Enovsys argued that the 
divorce decree was a binding judgment under which Whitfield retained no 
community property interest in the patents.71  The court agreed with 
Fomukong.72 
The court began by noting that ownership of legal title to a patent is a 
matter of state law.73  The court acknowledged the presumption that “all 
property acquired by a married person during marriage is presumed to be 
community property.”74  Noting the presumption applied here, the court 
made the following significant statement: “[p]rior to the divorce, the patents 
were thus presumptively community property in which Whitfield had an 
undivided half-interest.”75  Nevertheless, the court decided that the parties’ 
California state court divorce decree should be given preclusive effect, and 
res judicata prevented re-litigation of Whitfield’s community property 
claim.76 
Although the spouse was not found to be a co-owner in that case, the 
court’s decision plainly rested on the preclusive effect of the state court 
judgment finally resolving community property issues post-divorce.  But, 
and most importantly for our consideration here, the court noted that “prior 
to the divorce,” the spouse is entitled to an “undivided half-interest” in 
patents invented by the other spouse.77  That leaves open the possibility that, 
at least in a community property state like California, an employee’s spouse 
may, in fact, own an “undivided half-interest” in a patent an employee 
assigns to his employer. 
Taylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc.,78 a case out of the U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida, is a case with similar facts, but a 
different divorce decree, which turned out differently.  In that case, James 
and Mary Taylor were married February 14, 1987, and divorced March 7, 
2011.79  During the marriage, between about 1993 and 1998, Mr. Taylor 
conceived of, filed for, and received three patents.80  The parties’ divorce 
settlement identified the three patents as the primary marital assets of the 
 
 70  Id. at 1341. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Enovsys, 614 F.3d at 1341. 
 73  Id. at 1342. 
 74  Id. (citing Weingarten v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 4th 268, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002)). 
 75  Id. (emphasis added). 
 76  Id. at 1343. 
 77  Id. 
 78  No. 8:12-CV-746-T-EAK-AEP, 2013 WL 1798964 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2013).  
 79  Id. at *1.  
 80  Id. 
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marriage.81  The case did not address the reasons why Mr. and Mrs. Taylor 
listed the patents as marital property, despite the undisputed fact of Mr. 
Taylor’s sole inventorship (and, therefore, default legal title to the patent).  
Pursuant to the parties’ settlement, equitable proceeds from the patents were 
to be distributed 60% to Mrs. Taylor and 40% to Mr. Taylor.82  As best as 
can be gleaned from the record, the fact that the patents were considered to 
be marital assets was not in dispute, and we can assume the parties 
considered that fact to be uncontroversial when the patents were listed as 
marital property. 
In April 2012, Mr. Taylor sued Taylor Made Plastics Inc. (“Taylor 
Made”) for infringement of one of the three patents.83  Taylor Made moved 
to dismiss the claim for lack of standing, arguing that Mrs. Taylor was a legal 
owner of the patent and had not joined the lawsuit.84  Mr. Taylor argued that 
the divorce decree did not grant any ownership interest and that, therefore, 
Mrs. Taylor did not need to be joined.85 
The court recognized that the threshold issue of standing required 
examination of who owned legal title to the patent, and determined that 
whether Mr. and Mrs. Taylor shared legal title required reference to Florida 
law.86  The court noted that, under Florida law, property acquired during a 
marriage is presumptively a marital asset.87  The court noted the framework 
utilized by the Federal Circuit in Enovsys and analyzed the case under that 
same framework.88  The court began with the proposition that a patent is 
considered personal property under Florida law,89 and because the patent was 
issued during the marriage, similar to the Federal Circuit’s statement in 
Enovsys,90 it was presumed to be marital property “prior to the issuance of 
the Divorce Settlement.”91  The court said, “[t]he Divorce Settlement merely 
reinforced that presumption” by allocating equitable distribution of proceeds 
from the patent.92  The court concluded that Mrs. Taylor had legal title to the 
 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Taylor, 2013 WL 1798964, at *1. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. at *2. 
 87  Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6)(a)(1) (2012)). 
 88  Id. at *3. 
 89  Id. (citing Gulbrandsen v. Gulbrandsen, 22 So.3d 640, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)); 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property.”). 
 90  See Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 91  Taylor, 2013 WL 1798964, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2013) (emphasis added), aff’d, 
565 F. App’x 888 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 92  Id. 
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patent and dismissed the suit.93 
In an unpublished decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.94  The Federal Circuit noted that Mr. Taylor conceded on 
appeal that Mrs. Taylor was co-owner of the patent.95  Mr. Taylor’s only 
arguments on appeal were two unconvincing arguments about waiver, which 
the court summarily dismissed.96  Interestingly, however, before addressing 
Mr. Taylor’s arguments, the Federal Circuit noted in its brief, five-sentence 
summary of legal principles that “a party is not co-owner of a patent for 
standing purposes merely because he or she holds an equitable interest in the 
patent.”97 
In both cases in which the Federal Circuit considered patents as marital 
property, the Federal Circuit noted the presumption that patents of one 
spouse filed during the marriage were community or marital property of the 
other spouse, at least until a divorce decree settled the matter differently.  
There is no indication that the court at all considered the context in which an 
employee had an obligation to assign his interest in the patent to his employer 
(or anyone else) during an intact marriage.  Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s 
unpublished decision in Taylor was meant to provide a pragmatic “out” for 
corporate America, namely, that marital property might be considered 
equitable instead of legal title. 
That “out,” if it exists, needs further exploration.  The opinion, even 
unpublished, seems to add nothing to the overall disposition of the case.  It 
could just as well have been a summary affirmation without opinion under 
the Federal Circuit’s Rule 36.98  Instead, the court took the time to write an 
opinion that did no more than dismiss the appellant’s cursory arguments 
without discussion.  It might very well be, therefore, that the Federal Circuit 
was taking pains to point out the difference between equitable and legal title 
in a patent to invite a deeper discussion of the nature of marital property (i.e., 
is marital property owned legally or equitably) next time around.  While that 
reading of the court’s decision is purely speculative, it does raise an 
 
 93  Id. at *3. 
 94  Taylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc., 565 F. App’x 888 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 95  Id. at 889 n.1. 
 96  Id. at 889 (criticizing Mr. Taylor’s arguments as “stated only in a cursory fashion 
without any supporting facts”).  
 97  Id. (citation omitted).  
 98  See FED. CIR. R. 36 (“The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, 
citing this rule, when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion 
would have no precedential value: (a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court 
appealed from is based on findings that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence supporting 
the jury’s verdict is sufficient; (c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or 
judgment on the pleadings; (d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance 
under the standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or (e) a 
judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.”). 
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interesting issue.  As discussed above, the nature of patent ownership (i.e., 
legal or equitable title) is the critical inquiry in standing to sue.99  While that 
distinction may not matter in equitable distribution states because there is no 
automatic ownership by the spouse of property acquired while the marriage 
is intact,100 it might matter in a community property state where the spouse 
automatically acquires a one-half interest in property acquired during the 
marriage.101  If the Federal Circuit were suggesting that, at least in 
community property states, a spouse’s one-half interest in the spousal 
inventor’s patent should be considered equitable, that might at least resolve 
the thorniest standing issues.  However, no state (to the authors’ knowledge) 
has made that distinction.  Furthermore, creating such a distinction as to 
property owned during the marriage would create a second issue of whether 
the nature of the title is altered when property rights are assigned at the 
dissolution of the marriage. 
If, in fact, the Federal Circuit were consciously wading into that 
discussion, it would be curious for another reason.  The courts have long held 
that patent ownership is a matter of state law, not federal law.  Thus, if 
marital property is going to be considered equitably owned by a spouse 
instead of legally owned, it would be up to the states to make that 
determination, and such a determination would have to be made on a state-
by-state basis.  While the Federal Circuit may have posited one apparent 
solution to the standing issue, it is not one over which it would have any 
control, nor would it guarantee any degree of consistency.  Perhaps the 
proposed resolution by the Federal Circuit in Taylor is not such a resolution 
after all. 
Another clue as to how courts might resolve the conflict between 
marital property and a spouse’s obligation to assign inventions to his 
employer might be found in FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc.102  In 
FilmTec, the inventor, John Cadotte, assigned his patent to his own company, 
FilmTec Corp., and sued Allied-Signal for infringement.103  At the time 
Cadotte made his invention, however, he was employed by an organization 
known as MRI.104  The record on appeal did not include any agreement 
between Cadotte and MRI; however, the work being done by Cadotte for 
 
 99  See supra Part II (explaining that only a party holding legal title to a patent has 
standing to sue). 
 100  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 472 (discussing the use of title to determine ownership 
during marriage in equitable distribution jurisdictions).  Even in these jurisdictions, spouses 
may acquire ownership of marital property during marriage through joint tenancy, tenancy by 
the entirety and tenancy in common.  Id. 
 101  ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473. 
 102  939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 103  Id. at 1570. 
 104  Id.  
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MRI was pursuant to a contract between MRI and the government, whereby 
MRI “agree[d] to grant and d[id] hereby grant to the Government the full 
and entire domestic right, title and interest in [any invention, discovery, 
improvement or development (whether or not patentable) made in the course 
of or under this contract or any subcontract (of any tier) thereunder].”105  
Allied-Signal argued that the government, not FilmTec, was legal owner of 
the patent and had not joined the lawsuit, requiring dismissal of the 
lawsuit.106  The district court determined that the government had, at most, 
an equitable title in the patent, and denied Allied-Signal’s motion.107 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded to assess proper 
ownership.108  In its decision, the court laid out a number of principles that 
may have bearing on our problem.  First, the court addressed the issue of an 
“expectant interest.”109  The court noted that patents, as personal property, 
could be assigned between the time a patent is applied for and when it issues, 
and that “legal title to the ensuing patent will pass to the assignee upon grant 
of the patent.”110  Stepping back even further in time, an assignment of rights 
“made prior to the existence of the invention . . . may be viewed as an 
assignment of an expectant interest.  An assignment of an expectant interest 
can be a valid assignment.”111  At the time of the assignment, the invention 
is non-existent, and, therefore, the assignee has, at most, an equitable 
interest.112  But, “[o]nce the invention is made and an application for patent 
is filed . . . legal title to the rights accruing thereunder would be in the 
assignee (subject to the rights of a subsequent purchaser under § 261), and 
the assignor-inventor would have nothing remaining to assign.”113  On appeal 
the court noted that, “if Cadotte granted MRI rights in inventions made 
during his employ, and if the subject matter of the . . . patent was invented 
by Cadotte during his employ with MRI, then Cadotte had nothing to give to 
FilmTec and his purported assignment to FilmTec is a nullity.”114  In the 
court’s view, a present assignment of an expectant interest created an 
automatic assignment of legal title.  The court made this explicit later in the 
opinion.  Referring to the express grant from MRI to the government of 
future inventions, the court said, “no further act would be required once an 
invention came into being; the transfer of title would occur by operation of 
 
 105  Id. at 1570–71. 
 106  Id. at 1571. 
 107  Id. at 1570. 
 108  FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1574. 
 109  Id. at 1572. 
 110  Id. (citations omitted). 
 111  Id. (citations omitted). 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id.  
 114  FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1572. 
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law.”115  Without knowing what Cadotte’s agreement was with MRI, the 
court could not determine whether MRI had obtained title from Cadotte, 
which would then transfer automatically to the government, leaving FilmTec 
with nothing.116 
The court’s review of the record thus far was sufficient to require a 
remand, but the court anticipated and discussed a related issue that might 
arise.  The court noted that historically a third-party purchaser of a patent 
“for value without notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title” would 
acquire “ownership of the patent” free and clear of any prior equitable 
claim.117  The court then cited to 35 U.S.C. § 261, which provides that such 
a bona fide purchaser cuts off the rights of a prior assignee who has not 
recorded his assignment.118  The statute, the court concluded, went beyond 
the common law to cut off prior legal ownership claims as well.119  In the 
current case, the court referred to the district judge’s belief that FilmTec was 
such a bona fide purchaser, because, notwithstanding the automatic 
assignment under MRI’s contract with the government, that assignment was 
never recorded.120  The court did not rule on that finding, but did caution the 
district court on remand that a subsequent purchaser cannot merely be a 
“donee or other gratuitous transferee,” but must have paid “valuable 
consideration” so that he can “claim record reliance as a premise upon which 
the purchase was made.”121  Finally, the court noted that Cadotte, as a 
founder of FilmTec, may well have been aware of MRI’s obligation to the 
government (if not his own obligation to MRI), making any claim by 
FilmTec that it was a bona fide purchaser without notice dubious.122 
FilmTec raises important issues for our current conundrum.  First, it 
suggests that if an employer pays value for an employee invention (and in 
most states, employee wages and continued employment are considered 
sufficient value to compensate for assignment of inventions made within the 
scope of and during employment),123 the assignment from the employee to 
the employer will be free and clear of any legal title claims that had not been 
recorded.  The bona fide purchaser rule, however, protects a purchaser 
against an interest-holder who has failed to record the assignment of his prior 
interest.  In the context of marital property, though, the spouse’s interest may 
 
 115  Id. at 1573. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id.  
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 1573–74. 
 120  FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1574. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  See, e.g., Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 277 P.3d 81, 88 (Wyo. 2012) (also discussing 
the issue in other states).  
SHULMAN & UPCHURCH (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2019  2:43 PM 
18 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
arise automatically upon the other spouse’s acquisition of property; there is 
no prior assignment to record.  In addition, the bona fide purchaser portion 
of the ownership statute, 35 U.S.C. § 261, by its terms only voids a prior 
“interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or conveyance.”124  The 
spouse’s interest, however, arises by operation of law as marital property and 
is not the result of any “assignment, grant or conveyance” from the other 
spouse.  It does not appear that the recordation statute and bona fide 
purchaser rule would help the employer.  Second, FilmTec states that an 
expectant interest vests automatically as soon as the interest arises.125  Thus, 
if an employee makes a present assignment of future inventions, an employer 
might argue that invention immediately vests in the employer automatically, 
in essence, bypassing the employee.  That circumstance pinpointed the 
necessity in FilmTec to determine on remand whether such an agreement 
existed.  If such an agreement did exist, “then Cadotte had nothing to give to 
FilmTec and his purported assignment to FilmTec [was] a nullity.”126 
Carrying that analysis to the community property context, an 
employee’s assignment might pass directly to the employer, and the 
employee would then have “nothing to give” to his spouse.  But again, that 
fiction seems not to hold up to scrutiny.  In community property states, 
marital property is no less an “automatic” transfer from the employee to his 
spouse than it is from employee to employer.  Indeed, even after FilmTec, 
the Federal Circuit in Enovsys (applying the laws of a community property 
regime) stated that a spouse presumptively acquires an “undivided half-
interest” in marital property upon acquisition of that property.127  The race 
for which “automatic” ownership interest arises first would have to be 
decided as a matter of state law between marital property and employment 
contracts. 
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
 Federal Courts Cannot Use Preemption to Resolve This Dilemma 
The intersection between patent law and family law principles has the 
potential to create an irreconcilable conflict in the area of patent ownership.  
Patent law concerns itself with the distinction between equitable and legal 
title; marital property laws ignore any such distinction because such 
distinctions are irrelevant while the marriage is intact and immaterial to the 
equitable division of property at dissolution.  Patent law concerns itself with 
documenting transfers of title in writing; marital law looks to the actual 
 
 124  35 U.S.C. § 261 (emphasis added). 
 125  FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1572. 
 126  Id.   
 127  Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
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effects of property transfer without regard to formality to avoid manipulation 
of property distributions at divorce.  The two legal worlds operate by virtue 
of automatic vesting of title that appear to be unable to coexist.  Patent law 
automatically vests ownership of patents in inventors; marital law, at least in 
community property states, automatically vests ownership of property in the 
spouse. 
Consider the following problematic scenario under current law.  A 
married employee has agreed to “hereby assign to Company all right, title 
and interest in and to any inventions created in the course of my 
employment.”  Upon inventing a new product, for which Company files a 
patent, Company believes that, by virtue of his agreement, and relying on 
Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.,128 it has full legal title to the patent.  At the 
same time, however, employee’s spouse, relying on community property 
laws, believes she has a one-half interest in the patent.  When Company sues 
a competitor for patent infringement, the competitor moves to dismiss the 
lawsuit, arguing that Company lacks standing because Company failed to 
join the employee’s spouse as the other co-owner of the patent.129  A federal 
court would be called on to resolve the standing issue and would have to 
decide whether: (a) the assignment to Company “bypassed” the community 
property rights of the non-inventing spouse; (b) if not, whether the non-
inventing spouse’s ownership were legal or equitable; or (c) if the spouse 
would otherwise own legal title, whether federal preemption doctrine allows 
the court to formulate special rules of patent ownership to override 
community property regimes.  The reasons a federal court might want to 
utilize preemption doctrine to formulate such rules is evident.  Imagine a 
company with over 10,000 employees and thousands of patents, and at least 
hundreds of those (if not more) invented by married employees in 
community property states.  Just how many co-owners of the company’s 
patent portfolio are there? 
Yet, the authors propose that a federal court would have difficulty 
holding that, in matters of patent ownership, federal patent law preempts 
traditional state laws of community property.  First, marital law has long 
been the exclusive province of the states.130  Even though patent law is 
indisputably federal, and Congress’s power to enact patent laws derives 
directly from the Constitution,131 that federal power would be challenged 
were it to encroach on such traditional areas as family and marital property 
 
 128  211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
 129  See Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 130  Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 825, 872 (2004) 
(explaining that “[i]t is commonplace for courts and judges to assert that family law is, and 
always has been, entirely a matter of state government”). 
 131  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.   
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law.  Second, patent law would find little help from preemption principles.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that matters relating to the 
transfer of ownership of patents are essentially contracts for the transfer of 
personal property, and are, therefore, governed by state law regarding 
property transfer and contract.132  Thus, courts would have little chance 
resolving a conflict based on the concept of field preemption, i.e., “federal 
law leaves no room for state regulation and that Congress had a clear and 
manifest intent to supersede state law.”133  Courts have long recognized that 
states regulate patent ownership issues.  A closer case can be made for 
“conflict preemption,” which occurs when “a state law conflicts with federal 
law such that compliance with both state and federal regulations is 
impossible,”134 or when a challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of a 
federal law . . . .”135  Here, however, it is not necessarily “impossible” to 
comply with both laws; the outcome may just be undesirable. 
The issue of trying to balance patent law and marital law is even more 
complicated because the balance does not have just two sides of the scale.  
Instead, the same conflict exists fifty-fold, with each state having its own 
marital property laws that would need to be reconciled to create a cohesive 
solution to the patent ownership/marital property problem.  Given that 
dynamic, the expectation is that a resolution would have to come at the 
federal level.  But, for reasons explained above, current federal law likely 
does not preempt marital property law, even if the outcome is undesirable.  
It would seem, therefore, a federal solution needs to be a legislative one.  
Several are proposed below. 
 Proposed Modifications to the Patent Statutes 
The operating assumption of this paper is that the patent ownership 
regime needs fixing to accomplish two related goals: (1) provide 
predictability, and (2) avoid the patchwork of state marital property laws. 
One possible proposal would be for Congress to amend the patent laws 
 
 132  See, e.g., Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pac. Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282, 285 (1902) 
(“The rule is well settled that, if the suit be brought to enforce or set aside a contract, though 
such contract be connected with a patent, it is not a suit under the patent laws, and jurisdiction 
of the Circuit Court can only be maintained upon the ground of diversity of citizenship.”); 
Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting cases 
holding that state law governs patent ownership “long has been the law”). 
 133  Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687–88 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 134  Id. at 688 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 635–36 
(2011)). 
 135  Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 330 (2011) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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to state that ownership of a patent vests initially in the inventor alone, without 
regard to state law principles.  This proposal is the likely (though not 
necessarily strongest) argument to be made under current law, namely that 
patents vest in the inventor alone, and because patent ownership can only be 
transferred in writing, marital property principles are overridden.  As shown 
above in Part IV, however, it’s not clear those arguments would prevail in 
every case, especially in the majority of states that operate under community 
property regimes.  And, such a law would not be without controversy, as it 
would clearly have Congress invading an area of law long left to the states, 
or at least instructing that such law be ignored in particular circumstances.136 
An alternative proposal might attempt to thread the needle more 
narrowly by incorporating equitable marital property distribution principles.  
For example, Congress could amend the Patent Act to say that “an invention 
invented by an inventor having an obligation to assign via written agreement, 
who has received the benefit of that agreement during the marriage, may 
fulfill that obligation on behalf of the marital property without accounting to 
the spouse, so long as the inventor and spouse (a) were married prior to the 
invention, (b) were married prior to the obligation to assign, and (c) were 
continuously married through the date of conveyance from the inventor 
pursuant to that agreement.”  Additionally, the clause might say, “[a]n 
 
 136  There have been instances where Congress enacted laws that specifically overrode or 
modified outcomes that would have otherwise occurred under state property laws.  Most such 
statutes involved maintaining consistency in retirement benefits of federal employees or 
matters related to the U.S. Treasury.  Those matters deal, at their core, with questions of 
property and property distribution.  For example, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 
(1979), the Court considered the distribution of retirement benefits under a federal law that 
conflicted with state marital property law.  In that case, in California, a divorcing wife 
received no interest in the decedent husband’s benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 
1974, due to the federal statute explicitly stating, “the nonemployee spouse’s benefit 
terminates upon an absolute divorce,” even though California state law would have 
determined the retirement benefits as community property that flowed from husband’s 
employment in marriage.  Id. at 580.  Addressing the preemption of California law by the 
Railroad Retirement Act, the Court stated, “this Court has limited review under the 
Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has ‘positively required by direct 
enactment’ that state law be pre-empted. . . . State family and family-property law must do 
‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will 
demand that state law be overridden.”  Id. at 581 (citing Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 
(1904) and United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).  In Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 
663 (1962), a widower claimed rights to a U.S. Savings Bond co-owned with his late wife, 
over the claim of the late wife’s son who claimed interest under her will and community 
property laws.  Citing Treasury Regulations requiring a surviving co-owner to be “the sole 
and absolute owner,” the Court stated that “[t]he clear purpose of the regulations is to confer 
the right of survivorship on the surviving co-owner.  Thus, the survivorship provision is a 
federal law which must prevail if it conflicts with state law.”  Id. at 668.  It is not clear at all 
that patent law is as much intertwined with matters of property and property distribution as 
retirement benefits and ownership of U.S. debt. 
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inventor for whom the above clause applies137 shall be deemed to have 
assigned the full scope of rights described in the agreement.” 
That proposal focuses narrowly on the largest undesirable outcome of 
the conflict, namely, the uncertainty of corporate interests in their 
employees’ inventions.  This proposal, by its terms, would only come into 
play if the inventor-spouse had an obligation to assign the invention and the 
marital estate already enjoyed the benefit of that obligation (which may 
include continued employment of, and therefore income to, the inventor-
spouse).  From a marital property distribution standpoint, this proposal 
accomplishes what is likely an already assumed outcome, i.e., that the non-
inventor spouse assumes his or her share of the fruits of the labor of the 
invention.138  The further requirements of the proposal ensure that the 
legislation would only apply to patent transfers that might otherwise be 
impacted by marital property laws (in other words, the patents and the 
obligation to assign arose during the marriage). 
To see how this proposal would play out, consider a variation of the 
facts in Taylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc., discussed above.139  There, Mr. 
and Mrs. Taylor were married in 1987, the inventions were conceived of and 
patents received between 1993 and 1998, the parties divorced in 2011 with 
a 60%-40% split of the patents’ proceeds, and Mr. Taylor sued a third party 
for infringement in 2012.140  The court (affirmed by the Federal Circuit), held 
that Mrs. Taylor was a co-owner of the patents, and the suit was dismissed 
for lack of standing.141  But, consider if instead Mr. Taylor had assigned his 
patents in writing in 2010 to the Mister Taylor Company, divorced his wife 
in 2011, and the Mister Taylor Company sued a competitor in 2012.  Under 
community property laws and patent law as they presently exist, the outcome 
might very well be the same as it was in the original case, because Mrs. 
Taylor had a community property interest in the patents.142  Mister Taylor 
Company’s lawsuit would be dismissed for lack of standing.  Under the 
authors’ proposal, however, assuming the Taylors both benefited from the 
proceeds of the Mister Taylor Company during the marriage, (a) Mr. and 
 
 137  Or other appropriate self-referential language to be drafted as part of the statutory 
amendment. 
 138  Cf. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the fruits of 
the copyright vest in the marital estate under Louisiana law even if other individual rights of 
the copyright vest in the author-spouse under the Copyright Act). 
 139  See supra notes 78–97 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Taylor v. 
Taylor Made Plastics, Inc.). 
 140  No. 8:12-CV-746-T-EAK-AEP, 2013 WL 1798964, at *1–3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 
2013). 
 141  Id. at *7–8. 
 142  Setting aside the issue of whether, post-divorce, that interest were legal or equitable.  
Let’s assume it was legal title. 
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Mrs. Taylor were married prior to the invention in 1993–98, (b) Mr. and Mrs. 
Taylor were married prior to his obligation to assign in 2010, and (c) Mr. and 
Mrs. Taylor were continuously married through his conveyance in 2010.  
Accordingly, under the authors’ proposal, Mister Taylor Company would 
have full legal title to the patents and standing to sue. 
Consider yet another, more likely scenario.  Here, Mr. and Mrs. Taylor 
are married in 1987.  Mr. Taylor begins work at Acme Plastics Inc. in 1991 
and signs an employment agreement assigning future inventions to Acme 
Plastics Inc.  He invents numerous patented inventions from 1993 through 
1998, and during his employment the benefits of the employment accrue to 
the marital estate.  In 2011, he divorces Mrs. Taylor.  In 2012, Acme Plastics 
Inc. sues a competitor for patent infringement.  Under community property 
principles, the result is unclear at best because, depending on whether Mrs. 
Taylor’s interest is legal or equitable, Acme alone may not have standing to 
sue.  Under the authors’ proposal, however, because Mr. Taylor had “an 
obligation to assign [his inventions] via written agreement” and “has 
received the benefit of that agreement during the marriage,” and because Mr. 
and Mrs. Taylor “(a) were married prior to the invention [i.e., prior to 1993], 
(b) were married prior to the obligation to assign [i.e., prior to 1991], and (c) 
were continuously married through the date of conveyance from the inventor 
pursuant to that agreement [i.e., from 1993 through 1998],” Mr. Taylor 
fulfilled his obligation to assign to Acme Plastics Inc. without accounting to 
Mrs. Taylor.  Acme Plastics Inc. has full legal title to the patents (just as is 
assumed today). 
A legislative fix like the one above would intrude minimally on the 
state’s traditional province of family law.  While it does bypass certain 
property ownership conventions at play in community property states by 
providing a vehicle to nullify the automatic vesting of community property 
in the non-inventor spouse, it does so while still preserving the primary 
function of community property.  In particular, the proposal above requires 
the benefits of the agreement be conferred on the married couple (e.g., the 
income of the employee-spouse who is obligated to assign his inventions to 
the employer) before any assignment of rights voids the community property 
rules.  Additionally, and not insignificantly, it preserves the result that has 
been the standard operating assumption to date, namely, that the corporation 
has obtained full legal title from the employee-spouse. 
 Alternative Practical Proposal for Employers 
At least until Congress acts to resolve the competing ownership regimes 
of community property states and federal patent law, employers can 
proactively ensure they own their employees’ inventions.  One way an 
employer might do this is to have the employee and the employee’s spouse 
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consent in writing to the automatic assignment of future patent rights to the 
company.  In that case, the employee may sign the same present assignment 
of future inventions as she does today.  Her spouse, on the other hand, would 
separately sign some other agreement to permit transfer of full legal title to 
the patent.  For example, the spouse may sign a power of attorney giving the 
employee-spouse the right to transfer legal title of the invention from the 
marital estate.143  Employers might consider adding a separate section on the 
bottom of an employment agreement, after the employee’s signature, that 
states: “I hereby assign to Company, as a condition of my spouse’s continued 
employment, all right, title and interest, including all ownership interests, 
legal or equitable, including community property rights, in and to any 
Company inventions invented by my spouse, during our marriage, pursuant 
to this agreement.”144 
There are several possible impediments to implementing this solution.  
First, as a purely practical matter (and a matter of maintaining marital bliss), 
not every employee will want to have to present an employment agreement 
to his or her spouse.  Nor will every employee be willing (or able) to explain 
why the spouse’s signature is necessary.  It may look like an inappropriate 
intrusion into an employee’s personal life.  Second, to be properly 
administered, the employer would have to update these agreements when 
employees become married during their period of employment.  This may 
also be perceived as an inappropriate intrusion into employees’ personal 
lives.  Third, there is not really a good time to start implementing this type 
of agreement.  The moment an employer introduces this new form, it could 
be seen as an admission by the employer that it might not have good title to 
past inventions assigned under prior forms of agreement.  Similarly, unless 
the new form is executed by all married employees, those who don’t execute 
the form (assuming that the employer then does not refuse employment to or 
terminate the employee) may also create evidence of acquiescence on behalf 
of the employer to the employee’s spouse co-owning the invention as 
community property. 
However, corporate implementation of new employment agreements is 
 
 143  Some community property states provide statutory limitations on the ability of spouses 
to transfer community property, requiring, for example, that consent to be given in writing.  
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2019).  The fact that jurisdictions may enact 
additional limitations on the spouses’ control of community property demonstrates the 
challenge to employers navigating diverse marital property law. 
 144  Typical employment agreements define the scope of assignable inventions to be 
limited to those developed by the employee in the course of the employee’s employment, 
relating to the employer’s business, and developed using employer time or resources.  See, 
e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1060/2 (2019) (Illinois Employee Patent Act defining the proper 
scope of employee inventions assignable to an employer).  The authors have shorthanded that 
definition above to simply “Company inventions,” with the understanding that that term 
would be defined elsewhere in the employment agreement.  Id. 
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certainly manageable.  For example, employees who take advantage of 
employer health insurance are already on notice of the need to notify the 
employer of life changes (such as marriage) to extend insurance benefits to 
a spouse.  Notifying the employer of marriage is, therefore, not seen (in 
many, if not most, cases) as an inappropriate intrusion.  At the same time, 
implementing any new policy, or new forms, within an organization can be 
administratively difficult, but often human resource departments manage 
such changes on a regular (even if infrequent) basis as policies and regulatory 
environments change.  The largest, and perhaps most significant, risk, 
however, is the perceived admission that prior inventions without spousal 
assignments may still be subject to a spouse’s (or, in some cases, then-
spouse’s) ownership interest.  Since patents may have a term of fifteen145 to 
nearly twenty years,146 a company may find it necessary to obtain corrective 
assignments going back twenty years.  Some employees (or their spouses or 
ex-spouses) may not be easily locatable, or the interests may have passed to 
others through assignment or inheritance.  This risk, alone, might be 
sufficient to have corporations continue the status quo in hopes that either 
(a) their ownership is never challenged, or (b) if their ownership is 
challenged, courts figure out a solution favorable to them in their particular 
case.147 
 
 145  35 U.S.C. § 173 (term of a design patent is fifteen years from the issue date). 
 146  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (term of a utility patent is twenty years from the filing date). 
 147  A company holding an older patent might, for example, make some sort of equitable 
claim, like laches, to prevent a previously unknown co-owner from asserting ownership rights 
after a period of years.  There might be several problems with that argument.  First, the patent 
recordation statute, 35 U.S.C. § 261, is designed to address that circumstance in favor of a 
bona fide purchaser.  As discussed above, however, supra notes 124–125 and accompanying 
text, § 261, by its terms, only voids a prior “interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or 
conveyance.”  The spouse’s interest, however, arises by operation of law as marital property 
and is not the result of any “assignment, grant or conveyance” from the other spouse.  See 
supra Part III.C (discussing the rights of spouses to community or marital property during 
marriage).  Courts may not be willing to create an additional bona fide purchaser exception 
when Congress has already created one.  See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First 
Quality Baby Prod., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 961 (2017) (holding that laches could not override 
the statutory six-year limitations period for bringing a patent lawsuit, stating, “[l]aches is a 
gap-filling doctrine, and where there is a statute of limitations, there is no gap to fill.”).  
Second, until a patent is actually enforced, or licensed, the owner of a patent need never reveal 
himself.  While a patent owner could conceivably bring a quiet title action to resolve an 
ownership dispute, until either co-owner intends to make use of the patent somehow, i.e., to 
exercise any of its rights, there would be no reason to do so.  Third, at least under current law 
(and so far as the authors can tell), spousal owners may not fully appreciate the rights they 
may have in corporate inventions, and vice versa.  Without prior awareness of his interest, it 
would be difficult for a company to rely on equity to prevent a spousal co-owner from 
announcing his interest in the patent. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is a terrifying proposition to consider that thousands of patents, 
perhaps hundreds of thousands of patents, may currently have uncertain 
ownership.148  Corporations may have significant impairment of their patent 
assets on their hands.  In addition, savvy defendants to patent lawsuits may 
have standing arguments available to quickly dispose of patent infringement 
suits before they even get started.  A fix is required.  Courts may not be able 
to do it, and it may be too late for companies to implement a strategy 
effectively.  Congress should act to legislatively resolve the undesirable and 
unpredictable patent ownership outcomes occurring at the intersection of 
marital property law and patent law. 
 
 
 148  According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics, there are approximately 
500,000 issued patents with U.S. inventors.  See Independent Inventor Utility Patents by 
Country, State, and Year 
(December 2015), U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, (Dec. 2015)  
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/inv_utl_stc.htm (extrapolating data 
through 2015 to current date).  The U.S. marriage rate is approximately 50%.  See also Kim 
Parker & Renee Stepler, As U.S. Marriage Rate Hovers at 50%, Education Gap in Marital 
Status Widens, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/09/14/as-u-s-marriage-rate-hovers-at-50-education-gap-in-marital-status-widens/.  
